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Abstract
Background: The anthrax letter attacks of 2001 highlighted the need for rapid identification of biothreat agents not only for
epidemiological surveillance of the intentional outbreak but also for implementing appropriate countermeasures, such as
antibiotic treatment, in a timely manner to prevent further casualties. It is clear from the 2001 cases that survival may be
markedly improved by administration of antimicrobial therapy during the early symptomatic phase of the illness; i.e., within
3 days of appearance of symptoms. Microbiological detection methods are feasible only for organisms that can be cultured
in vitro and cannot detect all genetic modifications with the exception of antibiotic resistance. Currently available immuno
or nucleic acid-based rapid detection assays utilize known, organism-specific proteins or genomic DNA signatures
respectively. Hence, these assays lack the ability to detect novel natural variations or intentional genetic modifications that
circumvent the targets of the detection assays or in the case of a biological attack using an antibiotic resistant or virulence
enhanced Bacillus anthracis, to advise on therapeutic treatments.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We show here that the Roche 454-based pyrosequencing can generate whole genome
draft sequences of deep and broad enough coverage of a bacterial genome in less than 24 hours. Furthermore, using the
unfinished draft sequences, we demonstrate that unbiased identification of known as well as heretofore-unreported genetic
modifications that include indels and single nucleotide polymorphisms conferring antibiotic and phage resistances is
feasible within the next 12 hours.
Conclusions/Significance: Second generation sequencing technologies have paved the way for sequence-based rapid
identification of both known and previously undocumented genetic modifications in cultured, conventional and newly
emerging biothreat agents. Our findings have significant implications in the context of whole genome sequencing-based
routine clinical diagnostics as well as epidemiological surveillance of natural disease outbreaks caused by bacterial and viral
agents.
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Introduction
The central challenge in the rapid detection, identification and
characterization of microbial pathogens lies in the accurate
recognition of a trait, or combination of traits, that is unique to
a specific bacterial strain [1,2]. Traditional laboratory methods
largely used different types of phenotypic assays to perform this
important task, although this approach is limited to organisms that
can be cultured in a laboratory. Increasingly, DNA based assays
that detect known genomic signatures have been developed that
offer rapid and reliable identification of microbial pathogens [3,4].
These approaches can be used with both non-culturable pathogens
and when sample quantity is limiting. However, both the
traditional phenotypic and more recent DNA-based assays suffer
from a common limitation. They both require prior knowledge of
specific genetic variants that are found only within the known
microbial pathogen and are never found in unrelated organisms.
As a consequence, newly arising microbial strains or species with
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e12397functionally important, but previously unobserved, genomic
variants may prove difficult or impossible to detect and identify.
The ongoing revolution in DNA sequencing [5,6] enabling
ever-increasing sequence production at an ever-decreasing cost per
base, offers an opportunity to relax the requirement for prior
knowledge of strain-specific variants. Furthermore, the relatively
small footprint, both in terms of laboratory space and personnel,
required by these technologies may in the future enable them to be
broadly available for a large number of detection and identifica-
tion applications. New DNA sequencing platforms are already
enabling novel approaches to characterize bacterial genomes
[7,8,9,10], while at the same time profoundly altering our
understanding of the natural genetic variation present in microbial
populations [11,12].
Bacillus anthracis, a category A biothreat agent, is a spore-
forming, Gram-positive bacterium of the Bacillus cereus sensu lato
group. It is the etiologic agent of anthrax, which is primarily a
zoonotic disease associated with livestock. Until the intentional
anthrax attacks in October and November 2001, human cases of
inhalational anthrax in the United States have been historically
associated with workers in textile and tanning industries while two
cases of anthrax-like disease have been described in welders
infected by B. cereus [13,14,15]. Over a period of 100 years (1900–
2000) in the U.S. there were 18 recognized cases of inhalational
anthrax with a fatality rate (16/18) of 85% [15,16]. In Sverdlovsk,
former Soviet Union, in 1979, there was an outbreak of anthrax
cases due to accidental release of anthrax spores from a biowarfare
production facility, with similarly high fatality rate of 86% (68/79)
although the number of cases was unclear and the mortality rate is
probably lower [17,18]. The recent U. S. anthrax attack resulted
in 11 confirmed cases with five deaths -fatality rate 45% of
inhalational anthrax and seven confirmed and four suspected cases
of cutaneous anthrax all of whom survived [18].
Some of the epidemiological and clinical features of the 2001
U.S. cases have been published [13]. In 20 of the 22 cases a clear
link to letters containing anthrax spores was established [18].
Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of disease progression in the first
ten of the 2001 inhalational anthrax cases and two cases of
anthrax-like disease caused by B. cereus in 1996 [13,14], in relation
to the onset of symptoms and antibiotic therapy. In the first ten
cases of 2001 inhalational anthrax, the median incubation period
from the time of exposure to onset of symptoms when known
(n=6) was 4 days (range 4 to 6 days) and the mean was 4.5 days.
Victims sought care a median of 3.5 days (range 1 to 7 days) after
onset of symptoms. Eight of ten patients were in the early
symptomatic phase of illness when they first sought care. Of these
eight, six received antibiotics active against B. anthracis on the same
day, and all six survived. The two 1996 patients and four of the
2001 patients were exhibiting fulminant signs of illness when they
first received antibiotics and all six died. It is clear from these cases
that the survival may be markedly improved by administration of
antimicrobial therapy during the early symptomatic phase of the
illness; i.e., within the first 3 days of appearance of symptoms. All
patients received combination antimicrobial therapy with more
than one agent active against B. anthracis, which may have
contributed to the apparent improvement in survival compared
with previous cases. Other possible explanations for the improved
survival rate may include better supportive care, differences in the
pathogenesis of bioterrorism-related anthrax, differences in
susceptibility of the hosts, or a combination of the above [13].
Thus, early recognition of the pathogen and deciphering its
virulence properties, antibiotic susceptibility profile and any
evidence of genetic modifications natural or intentional are critical
challenges facing the biodefense community. Conventional
methods lack the ability to decipher all these properties in a
clinically relevant time frame.
In the last nine years since the 2001 anthrax cases, considerable
effort has been expended in developing rapid diagnostics and
therapeutics for biodefense agents [19]. Recent advances in second
generation sequencing technologies have allowed us to take this
one step further: sequence-based identification of pathogens and of
their virulence characteristics. Several recent studies have
demonstrated the potential of second generation sequencing
technologies for linking a phenotype to a specific genotype
Figure 1. Estimated timelines of WGS and finishing in relation to anthrax disease progression in anthrax cases. The anthrax disease
progression and the results of antibiotic treatment in the first ten cases of the 2001 anthrax letter attack [13] and two cases of anthrax-like disease
caused by B. cereus in 1996 [14]. Colored circles indicate when individual cases of inhalational anthrax from 2001 attack were started on antibiotic
therapy and colored triangles indicate when 1996 B. cereus fatal pneumonia cases resembling anthrax were started on antibiotic therapy. The crosses
indicate the time of death of 6 of the 12 patients. The bars in the top part of the top panel indicate the estimated timelines involved in obtaining WGS
sequencing from the time the patient seeks medical care. Currently, there is no standard protocol or fixed time frame for genome finishing and the
process varies from a few months to years depending on the complexity of the genome and approaches used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.g001
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generation sequencing technology for epidemiological tracking
and documenting the evolution of methicillin resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus (MRSA) during hospital transmission and intercontinen-
tal spread [23]. However, none of these studies have addressed the
timeline needed for deciphering genetic variants in a rapid
response scenario. An earlier attempt to predict the timeline
involved in deciphering genetic changes in a clinical context
proposed a six-week time frame for Francisella tularensis using
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) [24]. We reasoned that this time
frame could be shortened considerably in a rapid response
scenario, at least in the case of B. anthracis, using current
technologies and bioinformatic tools.
In this work we used currently available laboratory technologies
and bioinformatic tools and applied them in a number of different
scenarios, with a particular emphasis on how to rapidly recognize
genetic modifications in a known biodefense pathogen, thus
defining the time frame for this process. Using avirulent
erythromycin [25] and ciprofloxacin resistant B. anthracis strains
[26], we tested whether the genetic changes conferring antibiotic
resistance can be deciphered rapidly and accurately using WGS.
We demonstrate the utility of Roche 454 pyrosequencing
technology [27] and a bioinformatic pipeline to rapidly map both
known and previously unreported insertion, deletion and point
mutations conferring antibiotic and phage resistances in this
organism. Our work provides a proof of principle demonstrating
the potential of whole genome sequencing for the rapid
identification of relevant genetic variants in the public health
and biodefense arenas.
Results
454 pyrosequencing of B. anthracis wild type and mutant
derivatives
We resequenced and annotated eight B. anthracis genomes in
order to test the accuracy of 454 WGS technology for rapid
detection of genetic modifications in this organism. The bacterial
strains sequenced in this study and some of the basic statistics on
the draft sequence runs are presented in Table 1. All the strains
except gerH::ery were sequenced once either by FLX or Titanium,
and as expected the average read lengths were longer in Titanium
runs (361626 bps) than FLX runs (264615 bps). The number of
contigs for each de novo assembly was proportional to the
percentage of Q39 or lower quality bases (Table 1). The DANR
and HS-2-1 genomes assembled into a relatively higher number of
contigs compared to the other assemblies due to the contribution
of their higher proportion of lower (#Q39) quality bases. Lower
quality bases are likely to be sequencing errors that result in contig
breakage. Although genome coverage varied from 8x to 45x, the
percentage of the reference sequence covered changed by only
0.92%.
Testing the timeline involved in 454 based WGS and
identification of genetic modifications Correct identification
of previously known erythromycin cassette insertion in B.
anthracis. We directly tested whether the 454 WGS pipeline we
propose can generate reliable genome sequence data in the narrow
window of opportunity (3.5 days) presented by the timelines of
anthrax disease progression in the victims of 2001 anthrax letter
attacks (Figure 1). To test the timeline, we used B. anthracis Sterne
(34F2) strain and its derivative, gerH::ery mutant [25] for WGS either
by FLX or Titanium protocols.
Figure 1 also illustrates the timeline for WGS using Roche 454
pyrosequencing technology for comparison. Starting with purified
genomic DNAs of strains 34F2 and gerH::ery mutant we obtained
the draft sequences of each of these strains in 24 hours using the
FLX protocol. By comparison, sequencing using the Titanium
protocol took about 30 hours, because of longer bead washing and
signal processing steps. De novo sequence assembly took approx-
imately 45 minutes per genome and, notably, annotation was
completed within 40 minutes to 4 hours using a Linux 10-node
cluster, whereas performing this same annotation on a desktop
computer could take 24 to 48 hours. Three parallel approaches
were undertaken to identify the erythromycin resistance cassette in
the draft sequences of the gerH::ery mutant. 1) The contigs from the
mutant’s genome were aligned and compared to the annotated
reference genome (B. anthracis Sterne) by BLASTN using Artemis
Comparison Tool (ACT) [28] to identify the genetic modification
in the gerH gene. This comparison correctly identified an
approximately 1.2 kb insertion at the ClaI site in the gerHA gene
of the mutant. This 1.2 kb sequence was correctly identified as the
erythromycin cassette used in the original study [25]. This analysis
also revealed a 265 bp deletion downstream of the erythromycin
insertion (Figure 2). 2) Comparison of the genome sequences of
34F2 and the gerH::ery mutant by UniqueMER analysis and
subsequent BLAST analysis identified the same inserted bases. 3)
BLAST analysis of the unique genes from DIYA output of the
mutant’s sequence against ARDB (antibiotic resistance genes
database) [29] identified an erythromycin resistance gene not
present in its parent strain 34F2. In addition to this insertion, we
also found a high confidence variation in the gerH mutant at
BAS2094 that encodes a heat shock protein of the hsp20 family.
The relevance of this mutation in spore germination negative
Table 1. Statistics of genome sequence of wild type and mutant B. anthracis strains.
Strain
Reference
Genome
No.
runs
Run
type
Total no. reads
assembled
(% all reads)
Average
read length
(bps)
Length of
assembled
genome (bps)
No.
contigs Coverage
%
#Q39
% Refseq
covered
DANR Ames Ancestor 1 Titanium 138,842 (97.08) 355 5,071,481 1015 10 2.68 98.52
HS-2-1 Ames Ancestor 1 Titanium 109,279 (96.50) 355 5,046,834 1597 8 3.34 98.25
HS-2-5 Ames Ancestor 1 FLX 238,564 (99.46) 246 5,169,109 141 11 0.29 99.04
HS-2-5-6 Ames Ancestor 1 FLX 378,274 (99.63) 252 5,172,491 85 18 0.06 99.03
34F2 Sterne 1 FLX 453,716 (99.54) 274 5,356,131 101 23 0.06 99.07
gerH::ery Sterne 2 FLX 708,078 (99.84) 265 5,357,184 85 35 0.06 99.06
gerH::ery Sterne 1 Titanium 598,555 (98.68) 398 5,357,787 106 45 0.13 99.17
AP50R Sterne 1 FLX 398,980 (99.75) 282 5,355,287 104 21 0.06 99.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.t001
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genomic DNA, within 36 hours we identified the insertion of the
erythromycin cassette in the gerH gene.
Correct identification of previously known point mutations
in quinolone resistance-determining regions (QRDRs)
conferring ciprofloxacin resistance in B. anthracis. Next
we asked whether we could identify point mutations conferring
antibiotic resistance in B. anthracis by WGS. For two of the four
medium-level ciprofloxacin resistant strains sequenced in this study
(HS-2-1 and HS-2-5), mutations had been mapped in a prior study
[26]. HS-2-1 is resistant to medium-level ciprofloxacin, [minimal
inhibitory concentration (MIC): 8 ug/ml] and carries mutations in
gyrA (C-.T) and parC (G-.A) genes, while strain HS-2-5 carries the
same gyrA mutation (C-.T) and a different parC mutation (G-.T).
We tested whether one can identify these known mutations rapidly
and accurately in low-coverage (8x and 11x for HS-2-1 and HS-2-5,
respectively)wholegenomedraftsequences.UsingtheGSReference
Mapper tool to map reads against the reference genome sequence of
Ames Ancestor (NC 007530), we correctly identified the known
mutations in the two ciprofloxacin resistant strains (Table 2).
Identification of previously undocumented putative variations
Having shown the utility of WGS for mapping known changes
(insertion and point mutations), we tested whether we could
identify previously unknown genotypes for specific phenotypes.
For two other strains sequenced in this study, the genetic changes
responsible for the phenotypes (high-level ciprofloxacin resistance
and phage AP50c resistance) were not known prior to this work
and we wanted to test whether one can identify the putative loci
responsible for these phenotypes from the draft sequences.
Identification of genetic changes leading to high-level
ciprofloxacin resistance. Based on prior published data,
strain HS-2-5-6 exhibited high-level ciprofloxacin resistance
(MIC: 32 ug/ml). Sanger sequencing of the gyrA and parC genes
had revealed identical mutations to HS-2-1 but no additional
mutations were found in any of the known QRDR loci.I n
addition, the involvement of an efflux pump had been implicated
by increased susceptibility to ciprofloxacin in the presence of the
potent efflux pump inhibitor INF271 [26]. However, the gene
responsible for the efflux pump was not known prior to this work.
From single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and indel analyses,
four high-confidence variations were found to be unique to this
strain (Table 3). Of these, a deletion of 1,618 base pairs in an ORF
encoding a TetR-family transcriptional regulator (GBAA0834)
appears to be the most probable candidate for high-level
ciprofloxacin resistance. Four lines of evidence support this idea:
a) the ORF lies upstream of a gene that encodes a drug efflux
pump; b) other high-level ciprofloxacin mutants have been found
in this study to carry similar mutations in this ORF (data not
shown); c) these mutations were confirmed to be true positive
variations by PCR analyses (data not shown); d) during the
preparation of this manuscript another study reported the
involvement of this gene in high-level ciprofloxacin resistance
[21]. The precise mechanism by which mutations in this gene lead
to high-level ciprofloxacin resistance is currently under
investigation in our lab. Thus, using draft, unfinished sequences
produced by WGS we identified a novel deletion potentially
conferring high-level ciprofloxacin resistance.
Identification of a genetic change leading to spontaneous
phage resistance. Strain 34F2_AP50R was isolated as a
survivor of AP50c phage infection of B. anthracis strain 34F2.
Wild type 34F2 is susceptible to infection by AP50c phage but
survivors of phage infection appeared in a population at very low
Figure 2. Alignment of gerH region between 34F2 and gerH::ery mutant. Screenshot of the gerH region of B. anthracis strains 34F2 and
gerH::ery mutant by Artemis comparison tool (ACT)-based genome comparison. Blue bars indicate regions sharing significant matches using the
BLAST alignment tool. The genome viewer tool shows the insertion of the erythromycin gene in the gerHA gene and a small deletion within gerHA
gene downstream of the insertion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.g002
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causing phage resistance. Whole genome sequencing of
34F2_AP50R was performed using Roche/454 FLX protocol.
When the 34F2_AP50R WGS data were compared to the
parent 34F2, we found two high confidence variations in the
phage resistant mutant (Table 3). We reasoned that, of the two,
csaB (BAS0840) was the most probable candidate for phage
resistance since it is located in an operon just upstream of the sap
gene, which encodes an S-layer protein that is on the surface of the
bacterium [31]. Furthermore, we constructed a targeted deletion
and a number of point mutants of the csaB gene by markerless
gene replacement method described earlier [32] and these mutants
were found to result in AP50c phage resistance (manuscript in
preparation). We have shown that indeed the sap gene is also
involved in phage resistance and most likely is the receptor of
AP50c phage by creating a targeted deletion of this gene and
showing that the D sap strain is phage resistant (manuscript in
preparation).
All other variations found in the draft sequences
All other variations were evaluated by the following scheme in
order to determine the possible true positive versus false positive
variations. The GS Reference Mapper algorithm identified 879
SNPs in all the eight sequences obtained in this study. Of these,
221 were high quality (HQ) and 658 were low quality variations
(LQ) as defined by the same algorithm (see materials and
methods). Of the 221 HQ variations, 32 were found in DANR
derivatives and 189 in 34F2 and its derivatives. Of the 221
variations, only 93 were unique to any particular strain, while the
rest were carried from the parent to the descendants (identity-by-
descent variations). Thus, there were 93 unique HQ variations in
the seven strains (Table 3). True positive variations among the 93
were determined by two different approaches. Firstly, Figure 3
shows a graph of the percentage concordance (percentage of reads
with identical variant sequence) of the variant reads as a function
of depth of coverage for the respective position on the genome. We
postulated that true positive variations could be largely determined
as a function of the concordance level; i.e., variations with very
high concordant values would be true positives. Secondly, we
conducted a second round of sequencing of the high-quality
unique variants using the Sanger method to empirically test this
prediction. Sanger verification revealed that all the expected
causal variations related to the mutant phenotypes of interest were
true positives. In addition Sanger sequencing confirmed as true
Table 2. Location of true positive variants in the genomes of mutant B. anthracis compared to the reference genome.
Strain
Parent
strain
Start
position
Stop
position
Reference
allele
Sample
allele
Locus
description Coverage % Concordance
HS-2-1 DANR 6,848 6,848 C T gyrA 5 100%
3,364,887 3,364,887 G A parC 5 100%
4,009,233 4,009,233 G A Stage 0 sporulation protein A 6 100%
4,373,941 4,373,941 C A Hypothetical protein GBAA4810 6 100%
HS-2-5 DANR 6,848 6,848 C T gyrA 10 100%
2,667,930 2,667,930 T - Hypothetical protein GBAA2880 14 100%
3,364,887 3,364,887 G T parC 9 100%
4,500,491 4,500,491 G A intergenic 9 100%
HS-2-5-6 HS-2-5 841,481 843,099 1618 bp D tetR family transcriptional regulator 0 (D)* 100%
3,588,786 3,588,786 T C phosphodiesterase 14 100%
4,009,850 4,009,873 24 bp D Stage 0 sporulation protein A 11 100%
4,047,733 4,047,733 G T Hypothetical protein GBAA4446 21 100%
gerH::ery ** 34F2 chr 4,524,685 4,524,685 - EryR gerHA 45 100%
2,099,226 2,099,226 T C HSP20 family protein 33 100%
pXO1 172,178 172,178 20 bp D none 66 95%
AP50R 34F2 chr 895,066 895,066 A - csaB 14 100%
3,894,626 3,894,626 G A 2,3-diketo-5-methylthiopentyl-1-
phosphate enolase
81 0 0 %
*coverage for the 59 base (841,480) flanking the deletion was 13x and the 39 base (843,100) flanking the deletion was 4x.
**includes both FLX and Titanium runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.t002
Table 3. Determination of putative variants in the genomes
sequenced in this study.
Strain
No. putative
variants
(LQ + HQ)
No. HQ
putative
variants
No. unique
HQ
putative
variants*
No. Sanger
verified
unique HQ
putative
variants (TP)
DANR 71 1 1 1
HS-2-1 150 18 17 4
HS-2-5 23 5 4 4
HS-2-5-6 44 8 4 3
34F2 101 48 48 39
gerH::ery ** 425 97 17 1
AP50R 65 44 2 2
LQ Low quality. HQ High quality. TP True positive.
*Does not include identity by descent variants from descendant strains.
**Includes both FLX and Titanium runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.t003
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variations in the B. anthracis mutants are listed in Table 2, while the
true positive variations in parent strains are listed in Table S1.
Overall, only four out of 62 variations with a concordance of
$85% turned out to be false positive whereas no true positive was
found among the 27 variations with ,85% concordance. Based on
these data, we conclude that the true positive variations have very
high concordance rates ($85%) and most, if not all, low-
concordance variations are false positive variations.
Discussion
Almost nine years after the worst bioterrorism attacks in U.S.
history and subsequent extensive efforts in developing rapid
diagnostics and therapeutics to tackle such events some questions
still remain: How well are we prepared to face a similar attack?
How do we measure progress? One of the ways to address these
issues is presented in this article; i.e., can we identify a naturally
occurring or genetically engineered biothreat agent in a timely
manner. Because there was only a single strain responsible for the
2001 anthrax outbreak, decisions regarding initial treatment could
be made empirically [18]. However, isolation of genetically
engineered or spontaneous antibiotic resistant B. anthracis strains
has been reported in the past [33,34]. The implication is that
selection of antibiotic regimen was dictated for this event and will
be for any future episodes by the results of in vitro susceptibility
testing of the implicated strain [18]. Unlike rapid antibiotic
susceptibility testing, empirical determination with regard to
altered or novel virulence cannot be obtained in 72 hours. We
reasoned that, if WGS were used, this narrow window of
opportunity (72 hours) might be enough for deciphering genetic
modifications altering antibiotic susceptibility as well as virulence
in the suspected organism. We demonstrate that at least for a
monomorphic pathogen that can be cultured quickly, it is indeed
possible to identify both known and previously unknown genetic
modifications as rapidly as 60 hours using one of the second
generation sequencing technologies (454 pyrosequencing).
Another compelling reason for whole-genome sequencing-based
identification of genetic modifications is the emergence of novel
pathogens causing anthrax-like disease. Simple diagnostic tests
based on B. anthracis markers have the potential to exclude these
organisms as non-anthracis isolates, while sequencing can reveal the
presence of virulence factors similar to those present in B. anthracis
[35,36,37].
We demonstrate in this work that we could identify known
insertion and point mutations conferring antibiotic resistance in B.
anthracis. We also deciphered a heretofore-unreported putative gene
(GBAA0834) conferring high-level ciprofloxacin resistance. Taking a
similar approach, Serizawa et al identified the same gene using short
read sequence data generated by the Illumina Genome Analyzer II
sequencer [21]. The alleles of GBAA0834 described by these authors
are mostly SNVs (single nucleotide variations) whereas we have
found large deletions in five of 17 additional high-levelciprofloxacin
resistant mutants screened by PCR of GBAA0834 (HS-2-1-1, HS-2-
1-4, HS-2-1-7, HS-2-1-8, and S3-5; data not shown). Further
characterization of the remaining mutants is underway in our lab.
The mechanism by which inactivation of the tetR type regulatory
gene leads to high-level ciprofloxacin resistance is not entirely clear
at present; it may lead to derepression of the expression of the
downstream gene, which encodes a drug efflux pump. In support of
this hypothesis, Serizawa et al. [21] found in their mutant strains
upregulation of all three genes (GBAA0832, GBAA0833 and
GBAA0835) adjacent to the TetR type regulator (GBAA0834).
However, based on the deletion endpoints found in strain HS-2-5-6,
(which spans GBAA0832 and GBAA0833) we speculate that it is the
expression of GBAA0835 that is responsible for high-level ciproflox-
acin resistance while the other two genes are not involved in this
phenotype.
Figure 4 shows the general outline of the pipeline we adopted to
sequence and identify genetic modifications in B. anthracis.W e
estimated that within 24 hours after the patient seeks medical care,
the suspected bacterium can be isolated and its genomic DNA
extracted. We demonstrated that in the next 36 hours WGS can
be performed and the resulting draft sequences can be analyzed to
pin down any genetic modification in the suspected organism
using existing bioinformatic tools. The actual timeline involved in
these processes may vary and will depend on the complexity and
culturability of the organism and computing capacity of the
facility. The organism used in this study, B. anthracis, is known to be
a highly monomorphic species. On the other hand, the genome
from an organism with repeat regions or highly variable sequences
may show a much higher number of variations compared to its
most closely related reference genome and hence prove difficult to
assemble and take longer than 12 hours for downstream
bioinformatic analyses. The process and timeline outlined here
may also vary with the type of genetic modifications. For example,
we have not looked at inversions and copy number variations or
variations in gene expression leading to phenotypic changes or
complex polygenic traits. Despite these caveats, it is still feasible to
finish WGS of the suspected organism for further analysis within
the time frame of 36 hours after isolating the suspected organism.
Even in the case of a new organism without a preexisting reference
sequence, this time frame would be enough to at least identify the
pathogen at the genus and species level and possibly identify any
virulence and antibiotic markers by alignment to reference
databases. Expanding the repertoire of high quality reference
genome sequences of strains belonging to a multitude of genera
and species will undoubtedly fill this void.
Figure 3. Sanger-verified true positive variations as a function
of percent concordance and coverage.Validation of high quality
variations in the genome sequences produced by GS Reference Mapper
software. The graph shows the percentage of concordance among the
reads covering a variant position as a function of depth of coverage.
The graph indicates all the high-quality unique variations in the eight
genomic sequences obtained in this work. Circles represent false
positive variations while plus signs indicate true positive variations as
determined by Sanger sequencing. Squares represent identity-by-
descent (IBD) variations that were not verified by Sanger sequencing
as they were expected to be present in the descendant strains. The
various colors of the symbols represent different strains.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.g003
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continue to shrink as new sequencing platforms, wet lab
techniques and bioinformatic analysis pipelines evolve. Metagen-
ome sequencing, which involves sequencing directly from a sample
without culturing or purifying the organism, could shorten the
timeframe for rapid sequencing in response to a bioterrorism
event. There have been several recent examples where this
technique has been applied for the purpose of discovering the
etiological agent of an outbreak [38,39,40,41]. In one such
example, 454 pyrosequencing was performed directly from RNA
extract of serum and tissues of hemorrhagic fever victims and
detected a novel Lujovirus as the causative agent [41]. However,
metagenome sequencing of bacterial pathogens in clinical samples
has not yet become an accepted technique for identification of
important genetic variants such as drug resistance SNPs.
Our results show that next generation sequencing platforms
such as 454 pyrosequencing hold much promise for unbiased and
rapid detection, diagnosis, and genomic characterization in the
event of a bioterrorism attack or a natural disease outbreak. These
platforms deserve further exploration to determine how best to
utilize them during such events.
Materials and Methods
Bacterial strains
The bacterial strains sequenced in this study are listed in Table 1
and are as follows: B. anthracis Sterne strain (34F2, pXO1+,p X O 2 - ) ;
a 34F2 derivative, gerH::ery, which has an erythromycin cassette
inserted in the gerHA gene [25] and a 34F2 derivative that confers
resistance to phage AP50c due to a unidentified mutation. AP50 is
a B. anthracis specific diagnostic phage; AP50c is a spontaneous
clear plaque mutant [30]. DANR is a B. anthracis Ames derivative
that lacks both pXO1 and pXO2 plasmids [26]. Strain HS-2 is a
derivative of DANR with low-level ciprofloxacin resistance (MIC):
0.5 ug/ml) due to a mutation in gyrA and strains HS-2-1 and HS-2-
5 were derived from HS-2 and they exhibit medium-level (MIC:
8 ug/ml) ciprofloxacin resistance due to mutations in the parC
gene. The high-level ciprofloxacin resistant (MIC: 32 ug/ml)
mutant HS-2-5-6 was derived from HS-2-5 strain and it has as
yet unidentified genetic changes. The isolation, mapping and
characterization of mutants exhibiting medium levels of ciproflox-
acin resistance have been published [26].
Genomic DNA extraction and whole-genome sequencing
(WGS) by 454 pyrosequencing
Genomic DNA from various bacterial cultures was extracted
using Wizard genomic DNA preparation kit (Promega Inc). Whole-
genome sequencing (WGS) was performed using the Genome
Sequencer FLX (454 Life Sciences/Roche) using FLX or FLX
Titanium reagents according to the manufacturer’s protocols and
instructions [27]. Signal processing of FLX data was performed on
the sequencer itself, whereas signal processing of Titanium data was
performed off-rig on a Linux cluster of 10 nodes connected via
gigabit ethernet. Each node contained eight 64-bit processing cores
running at 2.3 GHz with 8 GB of RAM. De novo assembly of either
FLX or Titanium sequences, preliminary annotation of the genome
using the DIYA pipeline [42] and identification of the erythromycin
insertion were performed using the above-described computer
cluster. The genome sequences data generated in this study have
been deposited in the NCBI database under the project accession
number SRP001994.1.
Assemblies
All genomes were de novo assembled using the GS De Novo
Assembler(454/Roche). Coverage wasdefined asthe average number
of reads covering a site on the genome. ‘% Q39’ is the percentage of
bases with a quality score of less than or equal to 39 which is
equivalent to an error rate of approximately 1 in 10,000 bases.
Variation Detection
All putative variants were detected using two software
programs, GS Reference Mapper (454/Roche) and UniqueMER
Figure 4. Proposed pipeline for rapid identification of genetic modifications in B. anthracis. The three stages involved in genetic
characterization of B. anthracis in a rapid response scenario. The first day is needed for isolation of the organism from the patient and extraction of
genomic DNA. During the second day WGS will be performed using Roche 454 technology. The third day is needed to analyze the genome sequence
data and figure out genetic modifications. The various bioinformatics tools used in this work are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.g004
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by GS Reference Mapper was defined as high quality if it met the
following criteria: a) at least three non-duplicated reads showed the
same variation; b) at least one read with this variation in both the
forward and reverse orientations, unless there are at least five reads
with quality scores over 20 (or 30 if the difference involves a 5-mer
or higher). A more detailed description of differences is available in
the Genome Sequencer Data Analysis Software manual. Unique-
MER is a hash-based algorithm that detects unique sequence
regions and its approach does not limit the size of indels it can
detect.
Sanger sequence verification of variations found in
454sequences
A total of 95 HQ variations unique to the seven sequenced
strains, excluding the identity-by-descent variations were verified
by Sanger sequencing. Primers were designed 150–200 bp away
from the 59 and 39 ends of the variant position and the resulting
PCR amplicons (usually 300 to 400 bps) were sequenced using the
same primers in an ABI 3700 sequencer. Quality scores were
called with the program Phred [43,44] and the resulting Phred
scores along with the reference and parent sequences were
visualized using CodonCode Aligner (http://www.codoncode.
com/aligner/). Sanger-verified true positive variants showed
complete agreement in both forward and reverse orientations
and these variants were located within high-quality regions (Phred
score $20).
Mapping mutations
The variations were mapped to the respective genes or
intergenic regions using the published annotation of the reference
genomes Sterne (NC 005945) for 34F2 and its derivatives and
Ames Ancestor (NC 007530) for DANR and its derivatives by
Annotation Miner software (https://sourceforge.net/projects/
annotationminer/).
Genome Annotation
B. anthracis contigs resulting from de novo assembly were
annotated using DIYA (Do-It-Yourself Annotator), a modular
and configurable open-source pipeline software written in Perl
[42].
Supporting Information
Table S1 Location of true positive variants in the genome of the
parent strains compared to the reference genomes.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012397.s001 (0.09 MB
DOC)
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